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The jurisdiction of this court is based upon the Court's 
granting of the plaintiff Mounteer's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari to review the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Percy Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co,. 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 
71, 773 P.2d 405 (Utah App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Defendant UP&L is dissatisfied with the Mounteer's 
statement of the issues presented for review. As the 
Complaint was dismissed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the 
issue for review necessarily arises from its factual 
allegations and inferences. The Complaint alleges that one 
employee, Nicki Larsen, intentionally defamed a co-employee, 
Percy Mounteer, and intentionally caused Mounteer emotional 
distress. UP&L employed both Larsen and Mounteer. UP&L did 
not intend, direct, participate nor ratify Larsen1s 
intentional tortious conduct. In fact, this intentional 
tortious conduct violated UP&L policies. Mounteer sustained 
injury to his psychological, mental and emotional well-being; 
suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and 
depression, all of which required psychiatric hospital 
treatment; and permanently and totally disabled him from 
employment. 
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Thus, under the alleged facts, the issue is: Has Mounteer 
stated a cause of action for damages against his employer for 
these injuries? 
Like that of the trial court, the standard for this 
Court's review is, construing the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, whether the plaintiff 
would be entitled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claim. Burnett v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., No. 880369, filed September 4, 1990, and 
cases cited therein. Indulging reasonable inferences in favor 
of the plaintiff applies only to the facts and not to the 
conclusions of law. See Kohen v. H.S. Crocker Co., 260 F2d 
790 (5th Cir. 1958). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The interpretation of §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) is 
determinative of the issue on appeal: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by 
an employee, whether resulting in death or not, 
shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer 
and shall be the exclusive remedy against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer and the 
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act 
shall be in place of any and all other civil 
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liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, 
to such employee or to his spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated 
or incurred by such employee in the course of or 
because of or arising out of his employment, and no 
action at law may be maintained against an employer 
or against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death 
of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, 
shall prevent an employee (or his dependents) from 
filing a claim with the industrial commission of 
Utah for compensation in those cases within the 
provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
UP&L is dissatisfied with the Plaintiff's statement of 
the case. UP&L's statement is as follows: 
On October 6, 1986, Mounteer was an employee of UP&L as 
was Larsen. Mounteer, while on the job, and at the hands of 
Larsen who was also on the job, suffered mental and emotional 
trauma at that time, as well as an aggravation of a job-
related mental trauma suffered two years earlier. Mounteerfs 
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Complaint alleged causes of action for defamation, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. UP&L's Motion to Dismiss, U.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6), was granted without prejudice on August 17, 1987. 
Record at Pages 10 & 107. (Hereinafter the Record will be 
cited as R. ) . 
While the Motion to Dismiss was under advisement, 
Mounteer sought to file an Amended Complaint. R. 41 & 103. 
Following the entry of the Judgment of Dismissal, the trial 
court, sua sponte, struck as moot the Plaintiff's Motion to 
Amend the Complaint. 
Mounteer presented to the trial court all of the probable 
state of facts in support of his claim. The fatal defects in 
Mounteer's pleadings, as identified by the trial court, were 
incorporated into the Order of Dismissal. Order Upon 
Plaintiff's Objections, R. 123; Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal, R. 125. 
The Plaintiff appealed the Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal to the Utah Supreme Court which transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion affirming the trial court's dismissal in 
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 107 Utah Adv. Rpt. 71, 77 3 
P.2d 405 (Utah App.1989). (Hereinafter Mounteer). A copy of 
the Court of Appeals opinion is attached hereto as Appendix 
A. 
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Mounteer then filed with this Court a Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari claiming that the injuries suffered by Mounteer 
were not compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
and, therefore, not barred from a civil suit against the 
employer by §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988). The Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was granted by this Court on June 5, 1990. 
The following are the facts alleged in the Complaint: 
1. At all times relevent to the Mounteer's claim, 
Mounteer and Larsen were employees of UP&L and were acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. Complaint fj 3, 4, 
5 & 7; R. 2, 3 & 4. 
2. UP&L instructed Larsen to "investigate" Mounteer for 
drug use according to UP&L's specific policies for such an 
investigation. Complaint ffl 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5. 
3. Larsen's conduct which injured Mounteer violated 
those policies. Complaint ff 7 & 16, R. 4 & 5. 
4. Larsen's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent, 
malicious, outrageous and reckless. Complaint ff 17, 19 & 21, 
R. 5 & 6. 
5. Mounteer makes no allegation from which it can be 
inferred that UP&L intended, directed, participated or 
ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts. 
6. Mounteer has conceded that under no state of the 
alleged facts can it be proven that UP&L intended, directed, 
participated or ratified Larsen's intentional tortious acts. 
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Transcript of July 31, 1987, Hearing Upon Motion to Dismiss, 
Page 15, Line 9-16 & 23-24 R. 164; Page 16, Line 10-12, R. 
165; Page 18, Line 13-20, R. 167. 
7. As the result of Larsen's intentional torts, 
Mounteer suffered severe mental and emotional damage requiring 
psychiatric hospital treatment. Complaint f 10. 
Additionally, he suffered severe aggravation of a post-
traumatic stress disorder, permanently and totally disabling 
him from employment. Complaint 5 11. Mounteer sought 
recovery of the substantial medical costs and expenses which 
he incurred and expected to incur. Complaint 5 12 & 18. 
8. Only in the prayer for relief does Mounteer request 
damages for embarrassment and damage to his reputation. 
Complaint Prayer for Relief f 2. In Paragraph 1 to the 
Prayer, the Plaintiff requests "for judgment for slander, in 
the amount of $500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, 
for permanent, total disability due to post-traumatic stress 
disorder." Complaint Prayer for Relief 5 1. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As he did before the trial court and before the Court of 
Appeals, Mounteer again ignores the "key fact that he was 
Larsen's fellow employee when he was allegedly injured in the 
course of his employment by Larsen's performance of her 
assigned task and refuses to acknowledge that the workers' 
compensation statute has reshaped an employer's liability in 
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such circumstances." Mounteer at 407. Mounteer's claim must 
be analyzed in light of the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act 
which defines the employee's rights and the employer's 
obligations in cases of injuries suffered on the job. When 
so analyzed, it is apparent that Mounteer does not state a 
cause of action against UP&L. UP&L did not act, or fail to 
act, in any manner which lifts the bar to civil suit in §35-
1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988) . UP&L did not act, or fail to act, 
in any manner which makes UP&L liable for Larsen's intentional 
torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior, regardless 
of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The injury-causing 
event was an accident. Finally, the entirety of Mounteer's 
injuries are compensable under the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MOUNTEER ALLEGES NO ACTIONABLE CONDUCT OR OMISSION BY 
UP&L 
Mounteer acknowledges an absence of any fact or inference 
that UP&L caused or contributed to the injury-causing event 
of October 6, 1986, or to his injuries. The sole basis of his 
claim against UP&L is that UP&L employed Larsen. Were the 
analysis to stop there, the Complaint would withstand a Motion 
to Dismiss. However, when one adds the additional fact that 
Mounteer also was employed by UP&L and the injury occurred 
while both Mounteer and Larsen were on the job, then UP&L's 
only connection to the injury-causing event or the injury 
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itself is as an employer. UP&L's obligation is thus 
exclusively governed by the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and 
Mounteer's civil suit is barred. §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. 
(1988). 
If the employment relationship is the only connection 
between the employer to an employee's injury, then workers1 
compensation is the exclusive remedy against the employer. 
In Brvan v. Utah Intern'tl, 533 P. 2d 892 (Utah 1975), this 
Court held that while an employee is not protected by the 
exclusivity provision of workers' compensation from a separate 
action at law for damages resulting from the intentional 
injury of a co-employee, the employer must be shown to have 
some connection to the injury other than merely the status of 
employer, i.e. to have directed or intended the injurious act 
or the injury, before the employee may also sue the employer. 
In Mounteer, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled upon this 
issue by stating: 
According to Mounteer's own allegations, he was 
indisputably injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment. He was thus clearly barred by 
the statute from bringing a negligence action at law 
against either Larsen or UP&L. His allegations 
concerning Larsen's intentional conduct, however, were 
sufficient to state a direct tort claim against her that 
was not barred by the exclusivity provision in Section 
35-1-60, but she was not made a defendant, and UP&L 
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's intentional acts 
merely by operation of vicarious liability. Mounteer, 
at 407-408. 
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Even if Mounteer was not UP&L's employee, he must allege 
facts which would establish that UP&L itself acted or failed 
to act in a manner which caused his injury since without such 
facts UP&L is not liable for the intentional torts of its 
employee Larsen. 
In fact, Mounteer portrays UP&L as purely passive to 
Larsen's intentional torts. He does not and indeed cannot in 
good faith allege that UP&L itself spoke, hired Larsen to 
speak, or ratified her speech. Mounteer acknowledges that 
Larsen acted contrary to UP&L's direction and intent as 
embodied in UP&L's policies. Complaint f 7, R. 4. UP&L is 
not, as a matter of law, liable for Larsen's defamatory words. 
Therefore, under no state of facts as could be proven in 
support of Mounteer's claim, did he state a cause of action 
against UP&L and the Complaint was properly dismissed. 
II. FROM UP&L'S PERSPECTIVE, THE DECEMBER 1984 WILBERG MINE 
FIRE AND THE EVENT OCTOBER 6, 1986, WERE ACCIDENTS. 
Mounteer devotes much of his brief to the argument that 
defamation is not an accident within the meaning of §35-1-60 
Utah Code Ann. (1988) . But the facts alleged compel a finding 
that, as to UP&L, whose point of view is the reference point 
from which this judgment is made, the Wilberg Mine fire and 
Larsen's acts on October 6, 1986, and the injuries which 
befell Mounteer were accidental. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals cited as controlling the 
definition of "accident" in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n.. 729 
P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986) which held that an accident is an 
unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the 
cause of an injury or the result of an injury, Mounteer at 
408, ft. note 3. Thus, an intentional act resulting in an 
unintentional and unforeseeable injury is an accident. 
Allen further defines accident as a causal connection 
between the injury and injured worker's employment duties. 
Id. at 22. Such a connection is found throughout Mounteer1 s 
Complaint. Mounteer attributes his fragile mental state to 
the Wilberg Mine fire of December 1984 and he further claims 
his complete mental destruction by Larsen's acts of October 
6, 1986. He directly relates his injury to his employment 
duties by claiming a permanent and total disability from 
employment. In fact, except for an ambiguous reference to 
reputational injury in the Prayer for Relief/ Mounteer 
describes the injury-causing event, the injury itself, and the 
results of the injury to be as severe an employment related 
personal injury as the loss of a limb, being rendered blind 
or disfigured from a defective piece of machinery. All of the 
events described in the Complaint are, to UP&L, the 
1A mere naked prayer unsupported by affirmative allegations 
cannot aid a defective pleading. In re Somers' Estate, 187 
P.2d 433, 435 (Cal App 1947). A prayer for relief forms no 
part of the cause of action. Campbell v. Benson, 637 P. 2d 
578, 582 (N.M. 1981). 
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unexpected or unintended cause of injury or result of injury 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred in the course 
of, or because of, or arising out of Mounteer's employment. 
Further, it does not matter that the cause of the injury 
was the intentional tortious act of Mounteer's co-worker. As 
this Court has recognized in Bryan v. Utah Internftl. 533 P.2d 
892 (Utah 1975) , the reality of the workplace is that 
employees do not always conduct themselves as the employer 
wishes or in accord with the employer's policies. At times, 
employees may deviate from their duties and engage in 
intentional injurious conduct of many forms. Unless the 
employer intended or directed this deviation, to the employer 
the injury caused by the intentional conduct is "one more 
industrial mishap in the factory," for which the employer is 
not liable. Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law. §68.21 at 
13-74. 
Accordingly, under any state of facts which Mounteer 
could prove in support of his claim, the cause of his injuries 
and the results of his injuries were as to UP&L an accident. 
His claim is barred and the Motion to Dismiss was properly 
granted. 
III. MOUNTEER'S CLAIM IS FOR INJURIES WHICH ARE COMPENSABLE 
UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT. 
In the Complaint, Mounteer describes his injuries 
exclusively as injuries which are compensable under the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act. Mounteer's involvement in the 
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Wilberg Mine fire set a stage of mental stress which Larsen's 
intentional tortious acts aggravated to a state of disabling 
mental and emotional injury, requiring hospitalization. He 
incurred extensive medical costs and anticipates substantial 
future medical costs, 
Mounteer described his injuries in his Complaint, before 
the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals, as personal 
injuries consisting of mental trauma, distress and emotional 
disorders. All of Mounteer's allegations emphasize the 
physical and mental character of the injuries, relating them 
to a series of specific, stressful, work-related incidents. 
The root cause of Mounteer's injuries was his involvement in 
the Wilberg Mine disaster of December 1984. The incident of 
October 6, 1986, was an aggravating continuum of that 
stressful event. Construing the allegations in the light most 
favorable to Mounteer and indulging all reasonable inferences 
in his favor, one may conclude only that the injuries of which 
Mounteer complains are compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
Mounteer's Brief cites a series of cases which hold that 
to determine whether a civil action is barred by the 
exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation law requires 
an injury-oriented analysis. 
. . . the key to whether the Workmen's Compensation 
Act precludes a common law right of action lies in 
the nature of the injury for which plaintiff makes 
claim, not the nature of the defendant's act which 
plaintiff alleges to have been responsible for that 
injury. Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football 
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Club. 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. App. 1978); Accord, 
Foley v. Polaroid Corp.. 413 N.E.2d 711 (Mass. Supr. 
1980) ; Battista v. Chrysler Corp.. 454 A.2d 286 
(Del. Super. 1982). 
Thus, if the nature of the injury complained of is an 
accidental, personal injury, it is compensable and an action 
against the employer is precluded, regardless of the nature 
of the act. In this case, defamation is the act which is 
alleged to have been responsible for the personal injury. 
Damage to reputation is a proprietary rather than a 
personal injury and is not barred by the exclusivity 
provisions of workers' compensation laws. Battista, supra at 
289. Mounteer's claim is exclusively for personal injuries 
which have a medical identity, physical and mental impact, and 
are medically treated. 
The trial court inquired if Mounteer had filed a workers1 
compensation claim for such a claim would be decisive that the 
Motion to Dismiss should be granted. Transcript of July 31, 
1987 Hearing Upon Motion to Dismiss, Page 11, Line 11-14, 
R. 160. Such a claim was filed but was ultimately denied 
because of his failure to cooperate. Transcript Page 10-11, 
R. 159-160. 
Mounteer's pleadings and his oral argument before the 
trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals describe his 
injuries as injuries which are compensable under the Utah 
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Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, his claim against 
UP&L based solely upon UP&L's status as employer and not upon 
any active participation or involvement in the accident, is 
absolutely barred by §35-1-60 Utah Code Ann. (1988). 
CONCLUSION 
Mounteer has characterized his injury as personal and, 
therefore, compensable under workers1 compensation in his 
Complaint and claim to the Industrial Commission. Before this 
Court, he argues the injury was purely proprietary. It is the 
Complaint which frames the cause of action scrutinized by the 
courts below and which is before this Court. Compensable 
personal injury is the heart of Mounteer's claim as was 
recognized by the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Their decisions reflect an application of Utah law to the 
facts as plead, not the facts as Mounteer would like them to 
be. Their decisions are also based upon the prohibition of 
a double recovery one under workers' compensation, the second 
in an action at law. Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 423 N.W.2d at 
716, ft. note 6. 
Mounteer's claim for proprietary damages is, at best, 
peripheral to his personal injury claim. Even by indulging 
all responsible inferences in Mounteer's favor does not save 
his claim against UP&L. As a purely passive party, related 
to the injury-causing event and to the injury solely as the 
employer, UP&L is entitled to a dismissal. All attempts to 
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mold this case into something else distorts the integrity of 
the exclusivity provisions of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act. The rulings of the trial court and Court of Appeals 
should be affirmed. 
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that he discovered or should have discover-
ed the alleged misconduct by September 
1982, but his notice of intent to bring this 
action was not filed until November 1985. 
Therefore, we hold that his claim was 
barred by the one year statute of limita-
tions set forth in section 78-14-4(lXb). Ac-
cordingly, we find no error in the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for 
defendants. 
Finally, Floyd asserts that the special 
statute of limitations contained in the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act violates the 
equal protection clause of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions. However, 
Floyd failed to raise this issue in the trial 
court proceedings or preserve it on the 
record, and we decline to consider the issue 
for the first time on appeal. James v. 
Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
Percy MOUNTEER, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 880189-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 2, 1989. 
Employee appealed from final order 
and judgment of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Richard H. Moffat, J., 
dismissing without prejudice his complaint 
against employer arising out of security 
guard's alleged intentional broadcasting 
over public-address system that employee 
was using drugs. The Court of Appeals, 
Jackson, J., held that: (1) exclusive remedy 
provision of Workmen's Compensation Law 
POWER & LIGHT CO. Utah 405 
8 (UuhApp. !989) 
barred employee from bringing negligence 
action against either security guard or em-
ployer, and (2) employer was not liable for 
guard's intentional acts, absent allegation 
that it directed or intended those acts. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error $=>919 
In reviewing dismissal for failure to 
state claim, appellate court must construe 
complaint in light most favorable to plain-
tiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in 
plaintiff's favor. 
2. Pretrial Procedure <s=»624 
Dismissal for failure to state claim is 
appropriate only where it appears to cer-
tainty that plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of claims asserted. 
3. Workers' Compensation e=»2168 
Employee suffering compensable inju-
ry cannot maintain action at law against 
fellow employee who was merely negligent 
or an employer as vicariously liable princi-
pal; instead workers' compensation pro-
vides exclusive remedy to injured employ-
ee. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45, 35-1-60. 
4. Workers' Compensation «=»2168 
Employee who, in course of and scope 
of his or her employment, intentionally acts 
to injure co-worker is not protected by ex-
clusive remedy provision of Workmen's 
Compensation Law from separate action at 
law for damages, but in such a case em-
ployer is liable only to extent of workers' 
compensation benefits unless injurious act 
was directed or intended by employer. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-60. 
5. Workers' Compensation e»514 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, "accident" is unexpected or unintend-
ed occurrence that may be either cause or 
result of injury. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
6. Master and Servant e=>306 
Employer was not vicariously liable for 
intentional, injurious acts of security 
APPENDIX A 
4 0 6 Utah 773 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
guards investigating employee's suspected 
drug use, absent allegation that employer 
intended or directed those acts, which were 
allegedly in violation of company policy; 
guard announced on open-page system con-
nected to loudspeakers that employee was 
on drugs and persisted in making those 
allegations despite being advised that an-
nouncement was being broadcast on public 
address system. 
Robert B. Sykes, M. Gale Lemmon, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
Robert Gordon, Paul H. Proctor, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent 




Percy Mounteer appeals from the final 
order and judgment dismissing his com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action 
against respondent Utah Power & Light 
Company ("UP & L"). We affirm. 
According to the June 1987 complaint 
filed in this action, Mounteer worked as a 
warehouseman at UP & L's mine in Emery 
County, Utah. He was under elevated 
mental stress because of his involvement in 
the December 1984 Wilburg mine disaster. 
Niki Larsen, a security guard for UP & L, 
was instructed by her superiors at UP & L 
to investigate Mounteer for suspected drug 
use. UP & L had specific procedures to be 
followed in such cases. On October 6, 
1986, Larsen came to the mine, briefly in-
terviewed Mounteer at work, and 
in violation of company policy, and on an 
open-page system that was connected to 
loudspeakers, knowingly communicated 
to many of defendant's other employees 
that [Mounteer] was on drugs. When 
advised by another of defendant's em-
ployees that it was being broadcast on 
the public-address system, Larsen per-
1. Because this ruling resolved the legal merits of 
any cause Mounteer may frame against UP & L, 
the order dismissing his complaint without prej-
sisted and continued to make allegations 
to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs. 
These false statements, which Mounteer 
claimed were either intentionally, reckless-
ly, or negligently made by Larsen, resulted 
in severe mental and emotional damage 
that, in turn, resulted in Mounteer's hospi-
talization and the aggravation of his post-
traumatic stress disorder, rendering him 
totally disabled from employment 
Mounteer did not sue Larsen, and made 
no allegations of any negligent or inten-
tional injurious acts by UP & L directly. 
Instead, he sought to hold UP & L vicari-
ously liable in damages for the acts of its 
agent, Larsen, under three asserted causes 
of action. The first was for slander for the 
unprivileged publication of false and de-
famatory statements, which, "in fact, was 
in violation of the company's procedures 
with respect to allegations of drug 
use " The second and third causes of 
action were for intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. He re-
quested reimbursement for medical ex-
penses, and damages for permanent total 
disability, suffering, and damage to reputa-
tion. 
In the absence of any allegations that 
UP & L intended or directed Larsen's inju-
rious acts, which were allegedly in violation 
of UP & L's policy, the trial court conclud-
ed UP & L could not be liable. Mounteer's 
complaint was dismissed without preju-
dice.1 
[1,2] In reviewing a dismissal for fail-
ure to state a claim, this court must con-
strue the complaint in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff and indulge all reason-
able inferences in plaintiffs favor. Arrow 
Indus, v. Zions First Nat'l Bank 767 P.2d 
935, 936 (Utah 1988). Such a dismissal is 
appropriate only where it appears to a cer-
tainty that the plaintiff would not be enti-
tled to relief under any state of facts which 
could be proved in support of the claims 
asserted. Freegard v. First W. Nat'l 
Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). 
udice is final for purposes of appeal. See 
Bowles v. State ex rel Utah Dep't of Transp., 652 
P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982). 
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Appellant avers that his is a textbook 
case in which the employer should be vicar-
iously liable, under the principle of respon-
deat superior, for the negligent or inten-
tional acts of an employee/agent that in-
jure a third party while that employee is 
carrying out the employer's business and 
acting within the scope of employment 
See, e.g., Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989); Whitehead v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 101 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 24 (1989); see also Johnson v. 
Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988) (recogniz-
ing cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and enunciating stan-
dards for employer's vicarious liability to 
third party for punitive damages awarded 
against negligent employee). 
We agree that, viewing Mounteer's alle-
gations in a favorable light, as we must, 
reasonable minds could conclude as a factu-
al matter that Larsen was acting within the 
scope of her employment under the criteria 
enunciated in Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057, 
when she made the allegedly defamatory 
statements. However, the appropriate le-
gal analysis does not stop here. Mounteer 
ignores the additional key fact that he was 
Larsen's fellow employee when he was al-
legedly injured in the course of his employ-
ment by Larsen's performance of her as-
signed task and refuses to acknowledge 
that the workers' compensation statute has 
reshaped an employer's liability in such 
circumstances. See Masich v. United 
States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 
113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 615-17, appeal 
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct 138, 93 
L.Ed. 411 (1948); see generally 1 A. Lar-
son, Workmen's Compensation Law 
\% 4.10-4.50 (19&5V 
[3] Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988) 
provides: 
The right to recover compensation pur-
suant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, 
whether resulting in death or not, shall 
be the exclusive remedy against the em-
ployer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
2. This phrase was recently changed to "by acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of employ-
against any officer, agent, or employee 
of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in 
place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, 
to such employee . . . or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any acci-
dent or injury or death, in any way 
contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of 
his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer 
or against any officer, agent, or employ-
ee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee 
(Emphasis added.) If an employee suffers 
a compensable injury, defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-45 (1987) as one that occurs 
by accident arising out of or in the course 
of his employment,2 this section bars the 
maintenance of an action at law against 
either a fellow employee who is merely 
negligent or the employer as a vicariously 
liable principal. Instead, workers' compen-
sation provides the exclusive remedy to the 
injured employee. E.g., Morrill v. J & M 
Constr. Co., 635 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981); 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 
442 P.2d 31 (1968); Masich, 191 P.2d at 
616. 
[4] On the other hand, an employee 
who, in the course and scope of his or her 
employment, intentionally acts to injure a 
co-worker is not protected by this exclusivi-
ty provision from a separate action at law 
for damages. Bryan v. Utah InVl, 533 
P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). But, in such a case, 
the employer is liable only to the extent of 
workers' compensation benefits unless the 
injurious act was directed or intended by 
the employer. Id. at &35. Without such 
direct responsibility, the employer "could 
not be required to respond as the offending 
employee's superior." Stewart v. CMI 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1340,1341 n. 1 (Utah 1987) 
(dictum). See A. Larson, 2A Workmen's 
Compensation Law §§ 68.21, 68.23 & n. 
37, 68.33 & n. 49.1 (1987). 
[5,6] According to Mounteer's own alle-
gations, he was indisputably injured by ac-
mem." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988) (em-
phasis added). 
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cident3 arising out of or in the course of 
his employment He was thus clearly 
barred by the statute from bringing a neg-
ligence action at law against either Larsen 
or UP & L His allegations concerning 
Larsen's intentional conduct, however, 
were sufficient to state a direct tort claim 
against her that was not barred by the 
exclusivity provision in section 35-1-60, but 
she was not made a defendant, and UP & L 
cannot be liable at law for Larsen's inten-
tional acts merely by operation of vicarious 
liability.4 If Mounteer had alleged facts 
supporting an inference that UP & L di-
rected or intended Larsen's injurious acts, 
he would have sufficiently stated a claim 
against UP & L directly, and the statute 
would likewise afford UP & L no shield 
from liability in damages. "A complaint, to 
survive a motion to dismiss, must do more 
than merely allege intentional injury as an 
exception to the general exclusiveness rule; 
it must allege facts that add up to a delib-
erate intent [by the employer] to bring 
about injury." 2A A. Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law § 68.14 (1987). In the 
absence of any such factual allegations, 
however, the trial court correctly concluded 
as a matter of law that Mounteer failed to 
state a claim against UP & L 
The order of the trial court dismissing 
Mounteer's complaint is, therefore, af-
firmed. 
BENCH and GARFF, JJ., concur. 
3. Mounteer summarily contends that his inju-
ries are not compensable as resulting from an 
"accident" under section 35-1-45 (1987) because 
they did not arise from any "physical contact, 
strain, exertion or other physical cause" but 
from mental anguish and an exacerbated nerv-
ous condition resulting from Larsen's actions. 
However, as the Utah Supreme Court held in 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 ?2d 15, 22 
(Utah 1986), an "accident" for purposes of work-
ers' compensation "is an unexpected or unin-
tended occurrence that may be either the cause 
or the result of the injury." Whether Moun-
teer's injury arose from a physical or mental 
cause is, therefore, irrelevant to the issue of 
whether it occurred "by accident" within the 
meaning of the statute. 
James R. WESTON, Plaintiff, Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent, 
• . 
Pat L. WESTON, Defendant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
No. 870561-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 4, 1989. 
Husband commenced divorce proceed-
ing. The First District Court, Cache Coun-
ty, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., divided mari-
tal property, and appeals were taken. The 
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
(1) husband's stock in closely held family 
corporations was properly valued, and (2) 
husband could be ordered to make cash 
payments to wife rather than in-kind distri-
bution of stock. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
Trial court could value husband's stock 
in closely held corporations, in dividing 
marital estate in divorce action, at amounts 
to which husband and husband's expert 
testified, but without providing discount 
for lack of marketability of stock in closely 
held corporations. 
2. Divorce <8=>252.3(1, 5) 
Marital assets consisting of stock in 
closely held family corporation can be dis-
4. Commenting on- Thompson v. Maimonides 
Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 K.YS26 308 
(1982), in which an employee's causes of action 
imputing liability to the employer for a co-em-
ployee's defamation, negligence, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress were dismissed 
for this same reason, Professor Larson notes: 
This is true even if some of the harms resulting 
are of a kind for which compensation affords 
no remedy, such as loss of reputation, humilia-
tion and embarrassment The psychological in-
juries such as depression or psychotic reactions 
would, of course, still be compensable under the 
compensation act." 2A A Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law § 68.23 n. 37 (1987). 
